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As machine learning is being integrated into more and more systems, such as autonomous vehicles or 
medical devices, they are also becoming entry points for attacks. Many state-of-the-art Neural Networks 
have been proved to be consistently misclassifying adversarial examples. These failures of machine 
learning models demonstrate that even simple algorithms can behave very differently from what their 
designers intend. In order to close this gap between what designers intend and how algorithms behave,  
there is a huge need for preventing adversarial examples to improve credibility of the model. 
 
In this creative component, I have synthesized adversarial examples using two different white-box  
methods – ‘Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)[1]’ and ‘Expectation Over Transformation (EOT)[2]’. 








CHAPTER 1.     OVERVIEW 
 
1.1      Introduction 
 
Adversarial examples have been an interesting topic in the world of deep neural networks recently. 
Adversarial examples challenge the robustness of state-of-the-art machine learning/ deep learning models.  
It’s no surprise that Deep Learning is very effective and powerful in solving many complex computer vision  
problems. However, despite being extremely accurate, these Deep Learning models are highly vulnerable  
to attacks. One such attacks are adversarial examples. Recent studies by Google Brain have shown that any  
machine learning classifier can be tricked to give incorrect predictions, and with a little bit of skill, we can  
get them to give pretty much any result we wish. As many different fields are starting to use deep learning  
in critical systems, it is important to bring awareness on how neural networks can be fooled to result in  
strange and potentially dangerous behaviors, as most of them are crucial for our safe and comfortable life.  
Banks, surveillance systems, ATMs, face recognition on your laptop and very soon, self-driving cars. 
  
The authors in the paper – ‘Intriguing properties of neural networks’ [3]  discovered a worrying fact 
about the models they were experimenting with - that is we could often induce a network to change the 
predicted class of the label, while not changing that how that image is perceived by humans. A well-trained 
model should be relatively invariant to small amounts of noise. And, when it came to random noise, this 
was in fact generally the case, experiments have typically confirmed that adding true white noise to an 
image typically doesn’t impact the predictions of well-performing models. But when it comes to non-
random noise, noise specifically engineered to fool the network, a surprisingly small amount of such noise, 




           Synthesizing adversarial examples has also been proved to be fairly easy in the case where the 
attacker has knowledge about the model architecture and the underlying parameters and a bit difficult 
without that knowledge. Many algorithms have been put forward by researchers in order to generate 
adversarial examples based on the training set. The paper – Synthesizing robust adversarial examples[2] 
presents an algorithm to synthesize 3D adversarial examples which remain adversarial in real life. 
1.2       Goal 
The main goal of this creative component is to generate adversarial examples based on two different  
methods - ‘Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)[1]’ and ‘Expectation Over Transformation (EOT)[2]’. And  


















CHAPTER 2.       REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
2.1      Adversarial Examples 
 
An adversarial example is a sample of input data which has been modified very slightly in a way 
that is intended to cause a Machine Learning classifier to misclassify it. [1]  An attacker intentionally designs 
inputs to machine learning models to cause the model to make a mistake. Adversarial examples are referred 
to as optical illusions for machines. It is easier to get a sense of this phenomenon thinking about it in a 
computer vision setting, in computer vision, these are small perturbations to input images that result in an 
incorrect classification by the models. 
 
Why is it important? 
Deep neural networks are highly expressive models that have recently achieved state of the art 
performance on speech and visual recognition tasks. While their expressiveness is the reason they succeed, 
it also causes them to learn uninterpretable solutions that could have counter-intuitive properties.[3] Several 
machine learning models, including neural networks, have consistently misclassified adversarial examples, 
inputs formed by applying small but intentionally worst-case perturbations to examples from the dataset, 
such that the perturbed input results in the model outputting an incorrect answer with high confidence. 
Adversarial attacks are an important topic of research and consideration because it has been shown 
that adversarial examples transfer from one model to another. In other words, adversarial examples 
generated to fool one model can also fool other models using a different architecture or trained using 
different data sets for the same task.  AI Security is one of the areas that needs to quickly evolve to keep up 
with the advancements in deep learning technology. Following are some of the examples where adversarial 
examples make machine learning models vulnerable to attacks: 
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• A self-driving car crashes into another car because it ignores a stop sign. Someone had placed a 
picture over the sign, which looks like a stop sign with a little dirt for humans, but was designed to 
look like a unlimited speed sign for the sign recognition software of the car. 
• A spam detector fails to classify an email as spam. The spam mail has been designed to resemble 
a normal email, but with the intention of cheating the recipient. 
• A machine-learning powered scanner scans suitcase for weapons at the airport. A knife was 
developed to avoid detection by making the system think it is an umbrella. 
 
2.2     Types of Adversarial Attacks 
 
There are two different types of adversarial attacks based on the knowledge of the attacker – White Box 
attacks and Black Box attacks. White-box attacks are where the adversary has complete knowledge and 
access to the model, including architecture, inputs, outputs, and weights. Whereas, in the Black box attacks, 
the attacker only has access to the inputs and outputs of the model, and knows nothing about the underlying 
architecture or weights. It is fairly simple to synthesize adversarial examples for a model with known system 
architecture and underlying parameters, as in the case of white box attacks. Generating adversarial examples 
for black box attacks, where the adversary has no knowledge about the model being attacked, is an 
extremely difficult task which involves a lot of trial and error. One of the most well-known black box attack 
strategies is to train a local substitute network with a synthetic dataset: the inputs are synthetic and generated 
by the adversary, while the outputs are labels assigned by the target network and observed by the adversary. 
Adversarial examples crafted using the substitute parameters, are not only misclassified by the substitute 
but also by the target network, because both models have similar decision boundaries. Now this becomes a 
huge security risk as attackers can develop local models for the same task as the target model, generate 
adversarial examples for the local model and use them for attacking the target. This puts a whole lot of 
mainstream or soon to be mainstream applications like facial recognition, self-driving cars, biometric 
recognition etc. that leverage machine learning based computer vision models at risk. 
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2.3        Types of Misclassification 
 
 There are also several types of goals for an attacker, which are non-targeted misclassification and 
targeted misclassification. The goal of adversary in non-targeted misclassification is to only change the 
output classification from the true label and does not really worry about the new classification. Targeted 
misclassification is where the attacker wants to modify an image that is originally of a specific source class 
to be classified as a specific target class.   
 
2.4       Non-Targeted Misclassification 
 One idea is to generate some image that is designed to make the neural network have a certain 
output. Let the goal label be ygoal. We like to synthesize an image such that the neural network’s output is 
ygoal. We can formulate this as an optimization problem in much the same way we train a network. 
 
The output of the neural network given our image is y(x⃗). You can see that if the output of the 
network given the generated image x⃗ is very close to the goal label y_goal, then the corresponding cost is 
low. If the output of the network is very far from our goal then the cost is high. Therefore, finding a vector 
x⃗ that minimizes the cost C results in an image that the neural network predicts as the assigned goal label. 
The goal is to find this vector x⃗. This problem is incredibly similar to how we train a neural network, where 
we define a cost function and then choose weights and biases that minimize the cost function. In the case 
of adversarial example generation, instead of choosing weights and biases that minimize the cost, we hold 




Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3 are non-targeted adversarial examples for each class along with 
the neural network’s predictions, depicted below. They are adversarial examples generated for MNIST 
dataset. Though they look like images with random noise to human eyes, the model classifies them as 
numbers, in Figure 3, the model only predicts the image to be number 0, but also has a very high confidence 







Figure 1. Left side is the non-targeted adversarial example (a 28 X 28 pixel image). The right side plots 
the activations of the network when given the image. 
[4]
 
Figure 2. Left side is the non-targeted adversarial example (a 28 X 28 pixel image). The right side plots 









2.5       Targeted Misclassification 
 
 Non-targeted adversarial examples are generated by adding a term to the cost function that has been 
mentioned above and minimizing it. The cost function to synthesize non-targeted adversarial examples will 
be, 
 
 This is where we want xtarget to look almost similar to x. Minimizing the first term will make the 
neural network output y_goal when given x⃗. Minimizing the second term will try to force our adversarial 
image x to be as close as possible to xtarget as possible. λ out front is a hyperparameter that dictates which of 
the terms is more important. As with most hyperparameters we have to tune λ to find the best possible value 
to get the desired result. 
Figure 3. Left side is the non-targeted adversarial example (a 28 X 28 pixel image). The right side plots 





 Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 6 are targeted adversarial examples. They have been generated by 
adding very small calculated noise to the original MNIST images, thus making the model misclassify the 









Figure 4. Left side is the non-targeted adversarial example (a 28 X 28 pixel image). The right side plots 
the activations of the network when given the image
 [4]
 
Figure 5. Left side is the non-targeted adversarial example (a 28 X 28 pixel image). The right side plots 









 One of the most popular examples of targeted adversarial attack is from the paper – ‘Explaining 
and Harnessing Adversarial Examples’[1] where a small amount of calculated noise had been added to the 
original ‘panda’ image and the target label has been set to ‘gibbon’. Figure 6 shows that, not only the image 
which looks like a panda to human eye has been classified as gibbon, we can also notice how the model has 
very high confidence in the misclassification which is more than 99% in comparison with the correct 
classification which is just 57.7%. 
 
 
Figure 6. Left side is the non-targeted adversarial example (a 28 X 28 pixel image). The right side plots 
the activations of the network when given the image
 [4]
 





CHAPTER 3.     METHODS AND RESULTS 
 
 My focus for this creative component is to synthesize adversarial examples using two different 
white box attacks - Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) by Goodfellow et. al.[1] and Expectation Over 
Transformation (EOT) Method – by A. Athalye et. al.[2]  Many techniques have been put forward to generate 
adversarial examples. Most approaches suggest minimizing the distance between the adversarial example 
and the object to be altered, while changing the prediction to the desired label. Some methods require access 
to the gradients of the model, which of course only works with gradient based models such as neural 
networks, other methods only require access to the prediction function, which makes these methods model-
agnostic[5]. 
3.1          Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) 
 
The fast gradient sign method uses the gradient of the underlying model to find adversarial 
examples. The original image x is altered by adding or subtracting a small noise ϵ to each pixel of the image. 
Whether we add or subtract ϵ depends on the sign of the gradient for a pixel, positive or negative. Adding 
error in the direction of the gradient means that the image is intentionally modified so that the model 
misclassifies the image. It is designed to attack neural networks by leveraging the way they learn, gradients. 
The idea is to, rather than working to minimize the loss by adjusting the weights based on the 
backpropagated gradients, the attacker adjusts the input data to maximize the loss based on the same 
backpropagated gradients. This method computes an adversarial image by adding some weak noise on every 
step of optimization, drifting towards the desired class or away from the correct one. The adversarial 
example is generated using the following formula, 
                                                     xadv = x + ϵ ⋅ sign(▽xJ(θ,x,y)) 
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• x is the original image, y the class of x, θ the weights of the network and J(θ, x, y) the loss 
function used to train the network. 
• sign of the slopes to know if we should increase or decrease the pixel values to maximize the loss. 
• ϵ to ensure that the perturbation will be imperceptible. 
 
The paper also talks about how linear behavior in high-dimensional spaces is sufficient to cause 
adversarial examples and that enabled them to design a fast method for synthesizing adversarial examples 
that makes adversarial training practical. The authors also suggest that generic regularization strategies such 
as dropout, pretraining, and model averaging do not benefit a significant reduction in a model’s 
vulnerability to adversarial examples. They suggest changing to nonlinear models such as RBF networks 
can reduce the vulnerability of the models to adversarial examples. There is a tradeoff between linearity of 
the models (easy to train) and their vulnerability to adversarial examples. They project that it may be 
possible to escape this tradeoff in the future by designing more powerful optimization methods that can 
successfully train more nonlinear models. 
I have used fast gradient method to synthesize adversarial examples for MNIST dataset trained on a 
Convolutional Neural Network with the architecture as shown in Figure 7. 
 
 





              Figure 8 shows a snippet of code for the implementation of Fast Gradient Sign Method. I have 
generated adversarial examples using FGSM using different values of ϵ. It can be observed from Figure 9, 
that as the value of ϵ increases, the accuracy of the CNN model decreases. This is because increasing ϵ 
implies increasing the noise added to each pixel of the original image, which results in increasing the 




Figure 9. Code snippet to implement Fast Gradient Sign Method 
Figure 10. Accuracy of the model vs Epsilon 
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ϵ = 0 implies that no noise has been added to the pixels of the image, hence the model has an accuracy of 
nearly 99%. As the value of ϵ increases, the accuracy of the model decreases. When ϵ = 0 the model has 








Figure 11. Adversarial example for the image 2 when ϵ = 0.02 
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Figure 10 shows the set of adversarial examples generated for the image with number 2 when ϵ = 0.02. As 
the value of ϵ is very small, the adversarial image looks exactly similar to the original image. It is because 
only a very tiny amount of noise has been added to each pixel of the original image. 
 
 
From Figure 11, we can observe that there is a visible difference between the original and adversarial 
images, this is because the values of epsilon is much greater. As we are adding a significant amount of noise 




Figure 12. Adversarial examples for MNIST images when ϵ = 0.3 
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3.2          Expectation Over Transformation (EOT) Method 
 
 EOT uses a chosen distribution T of transformation functions t taking an input 𝑥ꞌ controlled by the 
adversary to the true input t(𝑥ꞌ) perceived by the classifier. Instead of simply taking the norm of 𝑥ꞌ - x to 
constrain the solution space, given a distance function d(.,.), EOT aims to constrain the expected effective 
distance between the adversarial and original inputs, which is defined as[2]: 
δ = Et~T [d(t(𝑥ꞌ ), t(x))] 
Rather than optimizing the log-likelihood of a single example, EOT uses a chosen distribution T of 
transformation functions t taking an input x 0 controlled by the adversary to the “true” input t(x 0 ) perceived 
by the classifier[2]. Thus the optimization problem in EOT is as follows: 
 
In practice, the distribution T can be any transformation such as random rotation, translation, or 
addition of noise. However, the method generalizes beyond simple transformations; transformations in T 
can perform operations such as 3D rendering of a texture. The authors have proved that a 3D printed turtle 
has been classified as a rifle in all possible angles. The authors also talk about how the methods to generate 
adversarial examples before have not been able to generate adversarial examples that are robust in real life, 
and hence they came up with Expectation Over Transformation method which can be used to synthesize 
adversarial examples which will be adversarial in real life scenarios as well. 
I have generated adversarial examples for Inception v3 network trained on ImageNet using 
expectation over transformation method. Synthesized a single adversarial input that’s robust to rotation by θ 









 I have set my target class as guacamole. As shown in Figure 13, ‘Tabby Cat’ has been misclassified 
as ‘guacamole’, the targeted class with 100% accuracy. The original image has been rotated by an angle of 
π/8. 
 
Figure 13. Code snippet to implement Expectation Over Transformation Method 






Figure 14 shows that the image remained adversarial throughout the transformation range. 
The authors have also been able to generate 3D adversarial examples by modeling the 3D rendering 
as a transformation under EOT. They optimized the texture of a 3D object such that the result is adversarial 
from any point of view. They considered a distribution that incorporates different camera distances, lighting 









Figure 15.  Rotation-invariance of the adversarial example 
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4.         SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 It has been observed that adversarial examples from excessive linearity of models. As many of the 
modern Neural Networks are piece-wise linear, it will be an easy task for the attacker to synthesize 
adversarial examples for them. One of the reasons could be, linear models usually assign unusual 
confidences as we move away from the decision boundary, even if there isn’t any data in those regions. 
There might be data points in those regions which do not belong to that class. There also might be a case 
where the distance between two samples in a certain subspace is almost negligible but they belong to 
different classes. As linear models do not consider all these possibilities, they are extremely susceptible to 
adversarial examples.   
 As there is a tradeoff between linearity of the model and its vulnerability to adversarial attacks, a 
lot of work must be done in order to come up with better optimization techniques for non-linear models, 
which may help in reducing the vulnerability of models to adversarial attacks. 
As mentioned before, sometimes the model has more confidence in the incorrect prediction than 
for the true one which indicates how powerful adversarial examples can be in challenging the robustness 
and reliability of the model. Even though the adversary might not be well aware of the model and its 
underlying parameters, Cross Model Generalization for Black Box Attacks makes it highly possible for the 
attacker to generate adversarial examples for unknown model architectures as well. 
Not only images but researchers have shown that adversarial examples can be generated for Natural 
Language Processing models too. In an example of Speech to Text model, changing two words completely 
changed the sentiment of the sentence. 
As machine learning is integrated into more and more systems, such as autonomous vehicles or 
medical devices, they are also becoming entry points for attacks. Although may defense techniques such as 
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Adversarial Training, Autoencoders, Ensemble methods and more have been proposed by researchers, there 
is no method that has been accepted universally, yet.  
Adversarial attacks pose a very real threat to AI security. Ultimately, while it’s important to look 
forward towards the future of AI development, we always need to be aware of the potential problems it 
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